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Abstract: In this paper, we study the relationships between binary lexicographic composition of 
rationales (see [Tadenuma, 2002]), prudent choices (see [Houy, 2008a]) and refined prudent 
choices (see [Houy, 2008b]) in the case of multi-criteria decision making. We show that these 
relationships are linked to the non-emptiness and rationality properties of these choice 
functions. 
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1 Introduction
In a series of recent articles, two processes have been proposed in or-
der to deal with multi-rationale choices. Let us consider two rationales (or
criteria). The first process, introduced in [Tadenuma, 2002] and applied in
[Tadenuma, 2005] works as follows. Let us construct the following binary
preferences: for any pair of alternatives, x and y, x is prefered to y if and
only if x is prefered to y when considering the first rationale, or, y is not
prefered to x according to the first rationale and x is prefered to y accord-
ing to the second rationale. Then, the choice function is the maximization
function of these composed binary preferences. By construction, since it
is the maximization function of binary preferences, this composed choice
function satisfies the most common rationality axioms (see [Sen, 1993] and
[Sen, 1977] for instance), α and γ. However, it is known that it is almost
never non-empty.
The second process has been axiomatized by [Houy, 2008a] in order to
avoid the problem of empty choices. When choosing from a any set, prudent
preferences are constructed. A prudent preference is one that contains the
first rationale and as many instances of the second rationale as possible with
the constraint that the prudent preferences remain acyclic. Since prudent
preferences are not unique, we define prudent choices as the set of alternatives
that maximize at least one set of prudent preferences. By construction,
prudent choices are always non-empty. We also know from [Houy, 2008a]
how rational they are (they satisfy γ but only a weak version of α.) We
prove in this article that actually, prudent choices satisfy α if and only if
they are equal to the first process described above and then, if and only if
the first process makes empty choices. Said differently, if the first process
makes empty choices, we can be sure that implementing the second process
will solve the problem of empty choices at the cost of irrational choices.
Conversely, if the second process makes irrational choices, implementing the
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second process will solve the problem of irrational choices at the cost of empty
choices.
A third process has been axiomatized by [Houy, 2008b] in order to refine
prudent choices. Since prudent preferences are not unique, we define re-
fined prudent choices as the set of alternatives that maximize all the prudent
preferences. It is known that refined prudent choices can make non empty
choices. Moreover, they satisfy γ but only a weak version of α (different
from the one satisfied prudent choices), see [Houy, 2008b]. We show in this
paper that refined prudent choices are a refinement of prudent choices that
always choose, possibly among others, the choices made by the first process
of choice. However, we also show that refined prudent choices are different
from prudent choices if and only if they make empty choices. Moreover, re-
fined prudent choices are equal to the first process of choice making if and
only if they are rational.
In the first section we give the notation and a few lemmas. Main results
are given in the second section.
2 Notation
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. X is the set of all non-empty subsets
of X, X = 2X \ ∅. A choice function on X is a function C : X → 2X such
that ∀S ∈ X , C(S) ⊆ S. Let C(X) be the set of all choice functions on X.
Let P ⊆ X×X be a binary relation on X. For any subset S of X, P |S is
the restriction of P to S, i.e. P |S= {(a, b) ∈ P, a, b ∈ S}. P
t is the transitive
closure of P i.e. ∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ P t if and only if ∃n ∈ N, ∃a1, ..., an ∈ X
such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P , a1 = a and an = b. We say
that P is irreflexive if and only if ∀a ∈ X, (a, a) /∈ P . We say that P is
asymmetric if and only if ∀a, b ∈ P, (a, b) ∈ P ⇒ (b, a) /∈ P . We say that P
is acyclic if and only if (a, a) /∈ P t.1 An asymmetric binary relation will be
1Notice that, by definition, acyclicity implies asymmetry and asymmetry implies ir-
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called a preference relation.
Let P1 and P2 be two preference relations on X. We define Q(P1, P2) by:
∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ Q(P1, P2) if and only if (a, b) ∈ P1 or [(b, a) /∈ P1 and
(a, b) ∈ P2].
Let (P1, P2) be an ordered pair of preference relations on X such that P1
is acyclic. Let S ∈ X . We say that P ⊆ X ×X is a prudent composition of
P1 and P2 on X if
• P = P1 |S
⋃
Q with Q ⊆ P2 |S,
• P is acyclic and,
• ∀Q′ such that Q ⊂ Q′ ⊆ P2 |S, P1 |S
⋃
Q′ is cyclic.
Then, a prudent composition of P1 and P2 on S is a binary relation containing
P1 |S and as many elements of P2 |S as possible with the constraint that
the prudent composition is not cyclic. We denote by ̂(P1, P2)(S) the set
of all prudent compositions of P1 and P2 on S. Notice that by definition,
̂(P1, P2)(S) is non-empty if and only if it is well defined or, said differently,
if P1 |S is acyclic.
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Let P ⊆ X ×X be a preference relations on X. We define CP : X → 2
X
by
∀S ∈ X , CP (S) = {a ∈ S, ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P}.
We say that P rationalizes the choice function CP .
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X × X be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic.
We define C∪(P1,P2) by
∀S ∈ X , a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) ⇔ a ∈ S and ∃P ∈
̂(P1, P2)(S) such that
∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P.
reflexivity.
2Obviously, if ̂(P1, P2)(S) = {∅}, we still have ̂(P1, P2)(S) 6= ∅.
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We say that (P1, P2) ∪-prudently rationalizes C. We define C
∩
(P1,P2)
by
∀S ∈ X , a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S) ⇔ a ∈ S and ∀P ∈
̂(P1, P2)(S),
∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P.
We say that (P1, P2) ∩-prudently rationalizes C.
The three following lemmas are axioms in the litterature. The first im-
poses that the choice function makes always non-empty choices. The second
and third are the usual Contraction Consistency (or Chernoff3 or α) and
Expansion Consistency (or γ) axioms (see [Sen, 1993]).
Axiom 1 (NE)
Let C ∈ C(X). The choice function C satisfies NE if and only if ∀S ∈ X ,
C(S) 6= ∅.
Axiom 2 (γ)
Let C ∈ C(X). The choice function C satisfies γ if and only if ∀n ∈ N and
∀S1, ..., Sn ∈ X ,
a ∈
⋂
i∈{1,...,n}C(Si) implies a ∈ C(
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} Si).
Axiom 3 (α)
Let C ∈ C(X). The choice function C satisfies α if and only if ∀S, T ∈ X
such that S ⊆ T and ∀a ∈ S,
a ∈ C(T ) implies a ∈ C(S).
The following lemma is well known in the litterature since it has been
stated in [Blair et al., 1954]. A good reference for these results in [Suzumura, 1983].
Lemma 1
Let C ∈ C(X). C satisfies α and γ if and only if ∃P ⊆ X × X such that
C = CP . C satisfies NE, α and γ if and only if ∃P ⊆ X ×X such that P is
acyclic and C = CP .
3See [Chernoff, 1954]
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The following lemmas characterize the choices made by CQ(P1,P2), C
∪
(P1,P2)
and C∩(P1,P2). The first result has been proved in [Houy and Tadenuma, 2008],
the second in [Houy, 2008a] and the third in [Houy, 2008b].
Lemma 2
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X. Let S ∈ X and a ∈ S. a ∈
CQ(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ P1.
Lemma 3
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. Let S ∈ X and
a ∈ S. a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ (Q(P1, P2) |S)
t.
Lemma 4
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. Let S ∈ X and
a ∈ S. a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S)
t.
As a simple corollary of the preceding lemmas, we can state that C∩(P1,P2)
is indeed a refinement C∪(P1,P2) that contains CQ(P1,P2).
Proposition 1
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. ∀S ∈ X , CQ(P1,P2) ⊆
C∩(P1,P2)(S) ⊆ C
∪
(P1,P2)
(S).
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3 Results
We will now study the non-emptyness and rationality properties of CQ(P1,P2),
C∪(P1,P2) and C
∩
(P1,P2)
. Proposition 2 states that obviously, C∪(P1,P2) satisfies NE.
Proposition 2
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X × X be two preference relations with P1 acyclic. C
∪
(P1,P2)
satisfies NE.
Proof. By definition. 
Proposition states that C∩(P1,P2) satisfies NE if and only if C
∩
(P1,P2)
=
C∪(P1,P2). Hence, we cannot refine C
∪
(P1,P2)
by C∩(P1,P2) without falling on a
function that is empty for some choice sets.
Proposition 3
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. C
∩
(P1,P2)
= C∪(P1,P2)
if and only if C∩(P1,P2) satisfies NE.
Proof. If: Assume that C∩(P1,P2) 6= C
∪
(P1,P2)
. Let S ∈ X be such that
C∩(P1,P2)(S) 6= C
∪
(P1,P2)
(S). By Proposition 1, C∩(P1,P2)(S) ⊆ C
∪
(P1,P2)
(S). Hence,
∃a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) such that a /∈ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(S). By Lemma 3, a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) im-
plies ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1. Moreover, by Lemmas 3 and 4, ∃c ∈ S, (c, a) ∈ P2,
(a, c) ∈ (Q(P1, P2) |S)
t, (a, c) /∈ (P1 |S)
t. Then, (Q(P1, P2) is cyclic. Let us
have A be the smallest cycle of Q(P1, P2) containing a and c. It is straight-
forward to check that we can denote A = {a1, ..., a#A} with (Q(P1, P2) |A=
{(a#A, a1)} ∪i∈{1,...,#A−1} {(ai, ai+1)} and with no loss of generality c = a#A,
a1 = a. Since (a, c) /∈ (P1 |S)
t, ∃i ∈ {1, ...,#A− 1} such that (ai, ai+1) ∈ P2
and (ai, ai+1), (ai+1, ai) /∈ P1. Hence, it is easy to check that C
∩
(P1,P2)
(A) = ∅.
Only If: By Proposition 2. 
Proposition 4 gives the conditions under which the predicates of Propo-
sition 3 apply.
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Proposition 4
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X × X be two preference relations with P1 acyclic. C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfies NE if and only if ∀A ∈ X , Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A) is acyclic.
Proof. If: Let A ∈ X . If Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A) is acyclic, then it has a
maximal element. Let us have a ∈ A such that ∀b ∈ A, (b, a) /∈ Q((P1 |A
)t, P2 |A). Then, by definition, ∀b ∈ A, (b, a) /∈ P1. Moreover, ∀b ∈ A such
that (b, a) ∈ P2, by definition of Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A) we have (a, b) ∈ (P1 |A)
t.
Hence, by Lemma 4, a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(A).
Only If: On the contrary, assume ∃A ∈ X , such that Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A)
is cyclic. By definition of Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A), it is asymmetric. Then we can
define n ∈ N \ {1, 2} and B = {a1, ..., an} ⊆ A such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
(ai+1, ai) ∈ Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A) where we define, for the sake of simplic-
ity, an+1 = a1. Let us have E = {ai ∈ B, (ai+1, ai) ∈ (P1 |A)
t}. For
all ai ∈ E, define ni ∈ N \ {1} and Di = {d1, ..., dni} ⊆ A such that
∀j ∈ {1, ..., ni − 1}, (dj+1, dj) ∈ P1 |A with dni = ai+1 and d1 = ai. Let
us compute C∩(P1,P2)(B ∪ai∈E Di). Obviously, for all Di, dni is the only el-
ement non dominated by P1. Hence, if C
∩
(P1,P2)
(B ∪ai∈E Di) 6= ∅, then,
C∩(P1,P2)(B ∪ai∈E Di) ⊆ B \ E. Let us have ak ∈ B \ E. By definition,
(ak+1, ak) ∈ P2. Assume (ak, ak+1) ∈ (P1 |B∪ai∈EDi)
t. Then, (ak, ak+1) ∈
(P1 |A)
t which contradicts (ak+1, ak) ∈ Q((P1 |A)
t, P2 |A). Hence, by Lemma
4, ak /∈ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(B ∪ai∈E Di). Hence, C
∩
(P1,P2)
(B ∪ai∈E Di) = ∅. 
The first result concerning rationality states that obviously, by definition
and Lemma 1, CQ(P1,P2) is rational in the sense that it satisfies both α and γ.
Moreover, it has been proved in [Houy, 2008a] and [Houy, 2008b] respectfully
that C∪(P1,P2) and C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfy γ.
Proposition 5
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X ×X be two preference relations. CQ(P1,P2) satisfies α and γ.
C∪(P1,P2) and C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfy γ.
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Proposition states that C∩(P1,P2) satisfies α if and only if C
∩
(P1,P2)
= CQ(P1,P2).
Hence, we cannot expand CQ(P1,P2) by C
∩
(P1,P2)
without falling on a function
that is not rational.
Proposition 6
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. C
∩
(P1,P2)
=
CQ(P1,P2) if and only if C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfies α.
Proof. If: Assume that C∩(P1,P2) 6= CQ(P1,P2). Let S ∈ X be such that
C∩(P1,P2)(S) 6= CQ(P1,P2)(S). By Proposition 1, CQ(P1,P2)(S) ⊆ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(S).
Hence, ∃a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S) such that a /∈ CQ(P1,P2)(S). Then, by Lemmas 2 and
4, ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1, ∃d ∈ S, (d, a) ∈ P2, (a, d) /∈ P1 and ∃n ∈ N \ {1} and
∃a1, ..., an ∈ S such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P1, a1 = a and an =
d. Then, by definition, a /∈ C∩(P1,P2)({a, d}) and a ∈ C
∩
(P1,P2)
({a1, ..., an}),
contradicting the fact that C∩(P1,P2) satisfies α.
Only If: By Proposition 5. 
Proposition 7 gives the conditions under which the predicates of Propo-
sition 6 apply.
Proposition 7
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X × X be two preference relations with P1 acyclic. C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfies α if and only if Q(P1, P2) ∪ P
t
1 is asymmetric.
Proof. If: Let A,B ∈ X be such that A ⊆ B. Let b ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(B). By
Lemma 4, ∀c ∈ B, (c, b) /∈ P1. Now assume that ∃d ∈ B, (d, b) ∈ P2. Then,
by Lemma 4, (b, d) ∈ P t1 . Hence, (d, b) ∈ P1 (else, Q(P1, P2)∪P
t
1 is symmetric
contradicting the assumptions). Then, ∀d ∈ B, (d, b) ∈ P2 ⇒ (b, d) ∈ P1.
Then, ∀d ∈ A, (d, b) /∈ P1 and [(d, b) ∈ P2 ⇒ (b, d) ∈ P1]. Hence, by Lemma
4, b ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(A).
Only If: Let us have Q(P1, P2) ∪ P
t
1 symmetric. Then, ∃a, b ∈ X such
that (a, b), (b, a) ∈ Q(P1, P2) ∪ P
t
1. By definition, Q(P1, P2) is asymmetric
and P t1 is asymmetric since P1 is acyclic. Hence, let us have, with no loss of
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generality, (a, b) ∈ Q(P1, P2) \ P
t
1 and (b, a) ∈ P
t
1 \Q(P1, P2). By definition,
b /∈ C∩(P1,P2)({a, b}). Now, let us have n ∈ N\{1, 2} and A = {a1, ..., an} such
that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P1, a1 = b, an = a. Then, by definition,
∀c ∈ A, (b, c) ∈ P t1 and ∀c ∈ A, (c, b) /∈ P1 by acyclicity of P1. Hence, by
Lemma 4, b ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(A) with a ∈ A. Hence a contradiction with α. 
Finally, we prove that C∪(P1,P2) satisfies α if and only if CQ(P1,P2) satisfies
NE if and only if C∪(P1,P2) = CQ(P1,P2) and hence, by the following results,
C∩(P1,P2) = C
∪
(P1,P2)
= CQ(P1,P2).
Proposition 8
Let P1, P2 ⊆ X×X be two preference relations with P1 acyclic. The following
are equivalent:
1. C∪(P1,P2) satisfies α,
2. C∪(P1,P2) = CQ(P1,P2),
3. C∩(P1,P2) satisfies α and NE,
4. CQ(P1,P2) satisfies NE,
5. Q(P1, P2) is acyclic.
Proof. 5 ⇔ 4: By Lemma 1.
2 ⇔ 3: By Propositions 1, 3 and 6.
3⇒ 1: By Proposition 3, if C∩(P1,P2) satisfies NE, then, C
∩
(P1,P2)
= C∪(P1,P2).
Then, if C∩(P1,P2) satisfies α, C
∪
(P1,P2)
does as well.
1 ⇒ 5: Assume that Q(P1, P2) is cyclic. Since by definition, Q(P1, P2)
is asymmetric, ∃n ∈ N \ {1, 2} and ∃a1, ..., an ∈ X such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
(ai, ai+1) ∈ Q(P1, P2) with an+1 = a1. Since P1 is acyclic, let us set with no
loss of generality, (a1, a2) ∈ P2, (a1, a2), (a2, a1) /∈ P1. Then, by Lemma 3,
a2 /∈ C
∪
(P1,P2)
({a1, a2}) whereas a2 ∈ C
∪
(P1,P2)
({a1, ..., an}) contradicting α for
C∪(P1,P2).
9
(5 and 4) ⇒ 3: By Proposition 1, CQ(P1,P2) satisfies NE implies that
C∩(P1,P2) satisfies NE. Let us have A,B ∈ X be such that A ⊆ B. Let
a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(B). By Lemma 4, ∀b ∈ B, (b, a) /∈ P1. Moreover, by the fact
that Q(P1, P2) is acyclic, ∀b ∈ B, (b, a) /∈ Q(P1, P2). Then, ∀b ∈ A, (b, a) /∈
Q(P1, P2). Hence, by Lemma 4, a ∈ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(A). 
The following examples show that the conditions given in Propositions
4 and 7 are independent. More precisely, let P1 and P2 be two preference
relations with P1 acyclic. It not necessarily true that if C
∩
(P1,P2)
satisfies NE
(resp. α), then it satisfies α (resp. NE).
Example 1
Let X = {a, b, c, d} and let P1 = {(a, b), (c, d)} and P2 = {(b, c), (d, a)}. By
Proposition 7, since Q(P1, P2)∪P
t
1 = {(a, b), (c, d), (b, c), (d, a)}, C
∩
(P1,P2)
sat-
isfies α. However, C∩(P1,P2)(X) = ∅ since
̂(P1, P2)(X) = {{(a, b), (b, c), (c, d)}, {(a, b), (d, a), (c, d)}}
Example 2
Let X = {a, b, c} and let P1 = {(a, b), (b, c)} and P2 = {(c, a)}. By Proposi-
tion 4, C∩(P1,P2) satisfies NE. However, it does not satisfy α since C
∩
(P1,P2)
(X) =
{a} whereas C∩(P1,P2)({a, c}) = {c}.
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